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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
I 'Iainti ff / Appe11ee, 
vs . 
BRIAN EUiF.NF' HUMPHREY, 
Defendant/Appe11ant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NAT?RE Qf PROCEEDINGS 
intent . ..;; ..t ribute methamphetamine, second degree 
felony, ;r . Lation i V:. Code Ann s? i 
(1995), and possessir 
peisc. 4 : .egree felony, violation - Tr.a* ' j.e 
.Ann. (1995) > ' 'our: h-~; jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code . 
1996) . .. - •:. •• •" ' • • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. T proper] y fi rid that the • • . • 
trooper - lefendant was driving was 
justifiably based on observed traffic v olations? 
appe I 1 rifl " I t !:'V lew \\\ I -i I i i ,-t I \ i - ..* rminination 
of whethe. n traffic violation was committed K.~ e 
officer"- presence under a clearly erroneous standard.'7 
Case No. 960069-CA 
Priority No 2 
State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah App. 1995)(citing 
State v. Delaney. 869 P.2d 4, 6-7 (Utah App. 1994)). 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that there 
was reasonable suspicion to stop the car for drug related 
reasons? A trial court's determination of whether an 
investigative stop was supported by reasonable suspicion is 
a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). The trial court's 
ruling should not, however, be subjected to wa close de novo 
review." Id. Rather, some deference is accorded the trial 
court because the reasonable suspicion standard itself 
"conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge [s]" so 
that they can "grapple with the multitude of fact patterns 
that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion determination." 
Id. at 939-40. The standard of review for trial court's 
findings of facts are set out in paragraph one, above. 
3. Did the trial court properly find that the 
detention of defendant did not exceed the scope of the stop 
beyond what was necessary to confirm or dispel Trooper 
Eldredge's suspicions %of drug activity or trafficking? The 
standard of review applied to this issue is set out in 
paragragh two, above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules, determinative of the issues in this case, are 
attached at Addendum A: 
2 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-117, -120, -121 31 0 (2 993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp. 1994); 
Utah R. Evid. 2 01; 
Utah Admin. R. 714 . *-..) 
STATEMENT QF THE CASS 
Defendant was charger uen-c* . • 1""" f •'- mati on wi t .1 i 
f oi ii: cii i lg \ > i Dlati :::i)i is , f i .,: r* comply • • • ..e il legal 
drug stamp tax, illegal possession r !irearm, dr ivi ng 
under the influence, possession of burglary tool^ iriving 
: : -lSe 
information enforcement officer (R. 4 - 6 ) . 
Following - preliminary hearing, the court ordered the 
defendant * - :-r I M .ill I n ounl s except tl le 
possession of burglary tools allegation (R. 17!. In 
response, the State filed a Second Amended Information 
nough record, defense counsel 
apparently filed a Motio: • Suppress the evidence obtained 
from a search of defendan p<-*. 
dri ving (See R, 29) (granting defendant • motion * •: rirvje 
suppression hearing) . Following suppression hearing, *.:,-: 
court denied defendant's motion (R. 1 8 8 ) . 
• • Def ei ician t ei ite i eel Ii 1: :i oi ia] g i i:ii ] ty plea 1" o 
possession with intent listribute methamphetamine, a 
second degree felony (Count and possession 
1 .. f<; i u i i " . wee*j.11 "ii I 1 IIJ i i i\ 
In exchange, the State dismissed all other counts 
3 
89). Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison to 
serve one to fifteen years for the drug conviction, and zero 
to five years for the firearm violation, the sentences to 
run concurrently (R. 89). 
Contemporaneous with his filing a notice of appeal (R. 
91), defendant petitioned for a certificate of probable 
cause (R. 85-86), which the court granted (R. 87-88). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 24, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Rick 
Eldredge stopped a vehicle being driven by defendant on 
State Road 191, approximately twenty miles north of 
Monticello, Utah (R. 107). Prior to making the stop, 
Trooper Eldredge overheard Troopers Ken Collier and Andy 
Peterson discussing how Trooper Collier had stopped a red 
Pontiac Fiero earlier that day near Bluff, Utah in which 
defendant was a passenger (R. 108). Trooper Collier 
explained that he stopped the car for no front license plate 
(R. 108)• However, after Trooper Collier received consent 
from the female driver to search the car and asked defendant 
to step out of the car so he could search, defendant yelled 
at the driver and told her not to let the trooper search the 
car (R. 108). Trooper Collier indicated at this point, "he 
felt that something was going on" (R. 108). However, he 
respected the driver's right to refuse the search and issued 
her a written warning for no front plate (R. 108). Trooper 
Collier then allowed the couple to proceed on their way (R. 
4 
I., Trooper Eidredge also learned from the conversation 
between Trooper Collier and Trooper Peterson that the female 
driver was Nicki Peterson, I h':j alleged -."fi t:i f r Lend of t ht:i 
defendant aini f. he daughter of Trooper Peterson (R. 108-09). 
Trooper Peterson subsequently called Trooper Eldredge 
on his radio arid asked Trooper Eldredq*5* to m^el with li it II  D 
(j I si'Liss Nirh i { w IH4) Trooper Eldredge met Trooper 
Peterson .in Crescent Junction (P 109) In his patrol car, 
Trooper Peterson began to tell Trooper Eldredge about' Nirki 
and some i<l hi'i I.IIUIJ related problems |H 10y) Micki had 
been using methamphetamine for six months; his son had told 
Trooper Peterson I lidf .N.icki had been us. i.ng methamphetamine 
f:or I IiH I, d si' yean , two v» fit!ki;\ ej.i I lei , INI in cki had threatened 
to kill him, his wife, and herself.; on another occasion, 
v111„••11 Nicki had called Trooper Peterson from Colorado, she 
ttwa.ci s(^ l"i in "i:11 in In HI I d m Il «••" iiini u i i d e r s L a n J f ieJI i m I h e p J i o n e ;"" 
and that based on what both he and his son had seen, it was 
his feeling that Nicki was using drugs pretty heavily (R. 
] 1 0) in roopei PeLerson u'l iso i n formed T i ooper hldredge 1 fiak 
Nicki had recently been involved with a man who was now In 
jail for controlled substances, and that he suspected she 
had turned to defendant ar another L'uuict; fui hei di uq hald 1. 
: . « " . ' • 
Trooper Peterson next; stated that I he person traveling 
with Nicki was Brad Davis (R I I mil Tmopei Peterson said 
iiMi i n - m e j v p u l i n f ii.ii t ik i ! i i . u i d u o u i
 (i H] dn I Univ i s" I: j oiTi s e v e r a l 
5 
officers with the Grand Junction Police Department ("GJPD") 
with whom he talked and worked with quite often, including a 
Sergeant Franklin of the GJPD Narcotics Squad. According to 
Sergeant Franklin, defendant's name "had been brought up in 
several drug-related incidents that had taken place in Grand 
Junction, Colorado" (R. 110-13, 179). Specifically, several 
people, who were arrested following the raid of several meth 
labs in the Grand Junction area, brought up defendant's name 
as a person being involved with the labs (R. Ill, 179). In 
addition, Sergeant Franklin had told Trooper Peterson that 
defendant's name had been brought up as both Mr. Davis and 
Mr. Humphrey, one of which was an alias (R. Ill, 179). 
Trooper Peterson also said that Nicki had admitted to 
him that she had transported drugs from Arizona to Colorado 
a couple of months earlier (R. Ill, 140). Trooper Eldredge 
then told Trooper Peterson that he had observed Nicki's red 
Fiero two or three days earlier traveling southbound near 
the Blanding area (R. Ill). Trooper Peterson responded by 
saying, "I can bet you that there's drugs in that car" (R. 
112). He suspected defendant and Nicki were transporting 
drugs from the Phoenix area, a known drug community, up to 
Grand Junction (R. 112). Trooper Peterson also mentioned 
that, according to the GJPD, "there was a lot of meth coming 
into Grand Junction" (R. 113). 
After talking with Trooper Peterson, Trooper Eldredge 
talked to Trooper Collier on the radio (R. 113) . Trooper 
6 
Collier reiterated what had, happened when he stopped the 
the defendant appeared "Very, very nervous and scared," and 
that defendant dropped or nearl y di Dpped his ID because he 
was s h a k i iig s ::: ba ::i ] y (R Il Il 3) '
 : ' " '• ' ' '' 
Trooper Eldredge then proceeded south to try to 
intercept the Fiero,, thinking that the couple might take 
• wa i: cis C ::  >] Dradc :i in • ox ie i : t c • a cdi • I • :: f f d cei s 
pa:: i oil iiig t :ie Interstate highway (R • ] 1 4) Wl lei i Trooper 
Eldiedge first observed the Fiero, :i 1: was going north with 
• .... In on and ruin f rnnl" plate 111 nhcnil, si.yty mi les 
per hour It'1 114) " As the car passed him, he noticed that 
the vehicle appeared dirty and muddy, and he could not see 
the t. -:u rrooper El dredge f o] Il owed til le • liar 
based on his susp i c i on of drug i e1at ed a ct ivi ty and the 
traffic violations he saw when he came into contact with the 
vehi c1e (R. ] 1 4 2 5 138 1 42) 
Trooper Ell d re dge stopped the car at about J , I.J p,m (R. 
141) 2 He approached the car arid asked defendant, now the 
After thf \r was seized and brought to the 
sheriff's office, Trooper Eldredge noticed that the front 
license plate was in one of car's windows (R. 1 38) 
• Throughout the proceedings Trooper Eldredge and 
defense counsel inconsistently indicated the events 
surrounding the stop occurred after either one o'clock or 
three o'clock (R. 122, 138, 141, 161-62). However, Trooper 
Eldredge's apparent reference to a written log, which logged 
his transmissions in military time, suggests that the stop 
occurred after three o'clock in the afternoon (R. 167). 
7 
driver, to produce his license (R. 115). Defendant handed 
him a license with the alias of Brad Davis (R. 115). 
Trooper Eldredge then asked Nicki, the passenger, to exit 
the car and talk with him at the rear of the vehicle (R. 
115). Trooper Eldredge pointed out to her the dirt covering 
the rear of the car which obscured the taillights (R. 115). 
Nicki retrieved a sock from the car which Trooper Eldredge 
used to wipe off the taillights (R. 115). 
While Trooper Eldredge ran a driver's license, warrants 
and possibly a criminal history check on both of defendant's 
names, he spoke to Nicki in his vehicle because it was cold 
outside (R. 116, 125-26). Nicki immediately appeared uvery, 
very nervous" and *fidgety" (R. 116). Trooper Eldredge 
asked her why she was so nervous (R. 116). Nicki responded 
that she was always nervous around cops (R. 116). Trooper 
Eldredge thought this was unusual because he and Nicki had 
known each other for several years (R. 116). Trooper 
Eldredge had home taught Nicki and her family, and his wife 
had also been her cheerleading advisor (R. 116). Trooper 
Eldredge thought it was strange that Nicki would be nervous 
around him since she knew him well (R. 116). 
When asked by Trooper Eldredge if she had any 
controlled substances in her car, Nicki responded she did 
not (R. 116). After asking if he could take a look in her 
car, Nicki asked Trooper Eldredge if he had a warrant (R. 
116). He said he did not but was working on getting one (R. 
8 
116) Trooper El dredge relayed his suspicions to Sergeant 
Doug Hall and dl sen issed get/ti ng a IA arran t (R 3 1 7) 
Sergeant Hal 1 fell t there "was not BI lough information for a 
IA a:::i:: r ant but advised Trooper Eldredge that a drug dog could 
per haps come up and sn i ff the car (R Il 31 7) By thi s time, 
initially stopped (R 13 7 18) , 
Trooper Eldredge then decided to la Ik with defendant 
a I)i 1111 11 J I' i'I I 1 i i i i i III 11.1 el I h i i i.i I ii i» U I 1 J d V J 111 1 i, i ) i 11, 1 tl i 1 I I •' ( 1 b LI I,i i-J III, d l J C e S 
(R 118, 1 45) I'rooper Eldredge had barely begun a 
conversation with defendant whe^- Ni^k* baling followed 
Ti oopei El di < cm ' \ri t: h 
d e f e n d a n t , s'.atec . i^ *t,-* c< varr-d a coat (F 3 1 8, 
163) Defendant offered hei his ia-V- -O, led, a black 
] eat her j ack- ' n dr 1 in t t • :: 
Trooper Eldredge .v. givt *.*- • i r, Lhdt t ime, 
Trooper Eldredge briefly parted .:-». . * -.at pocket and : 
f H I t " i i I . i r q t • I - ill in i nihil III'IN" • a s n i a ] 1 
r e v o l v e r 11-' J IB, 1 bb) i n s t e a d , t h e t r o o p e r found a g l a s s 
b o t t l e of i n j e c t a b l e x y l o c a i n e , a n e r v e b l o c k for e p i d u r a l 
use ! I III1 Jlh\ Tlif l;mtt w had im pi re sc r i pi-1 on label on 
i I -in 111II 1. i 11 I 1 • e d e I a J I <;»w } J I i. i II11.1»11 s 111 s p e n s i n g w i t h o u t a 
prescript ion*" {"h , 118) T r o o p e r E l d r e d g e t h e n s p l i t up 
d e f e n d a n t and Niclki t o q u e s t i o n them s e p a r a t e l y about t h e 
> j ' I in. d J in ' (r 11") P'o J eiiiicii il l u h l T i o o p e i E l d r e d g e i, 1 t 
t h e x y l o c a i n e was found i n an a l l e y and g i v e n t o him by a 
9 
friend (R. 118-19). Nicki said the xylocaine belonged to a 
friend with cancer who was using the drug as a pain killer 
(R. 119). 
Although the trooper did not immediately see any track 
marks on the defendant's arm, he later discovered one in a 
vein on the back of defendant's arm (R. 119). Trooper 
Eldredge administered field sobriety tests, which the 
defendant failed (R. 119-20).3 During the time Trooper 
Eldredge was administering the tests, defendant looked 
straight ahead, refused to talk to Trooper Eldredge, and 
appeared "uneasy" (R. 121-22). 
Based on all of these factors, Trooper Eldredge 
arrested defendant for driving under the influence of a 
stimulant believed to be methamphetamine (R. 122, 169). b 
Sergeant Hall arrived at 3:33 p.m., twenty-one minutes after 
the stop (R. 122, 167). The drug dog was dispatched at 3:43 
p.m., about thirty minutes after the stop, by which time 
defendant had been taken to the San Juan County Jail (R. 
123, 167). 
Nearly one pound of methamphetamine, a small amount of 
marijuana, and some drug paraphernalia was found in the 
3
 On the internal clock test, defendant estimated 
thirty seconds in seventeen seconds (R. 120). On the one-
legged stand test, defendant was uvery shaky" (R. 121). 
When asked to recite the alphabet from D to X, defendant 
instead went from D to Z (R. 121). Trooper Eldredge also 
had to explain the nine-step walk and turn test three times 
to defendant before defendant could understand and complete 
the test(R. 121). 
10 
Fiero (R 1 24) . ' Officers also uncovered a Rugger nine 
iiii :i ] ] :i m e t e r weapon a nd f01 lr o r f:i i > € mc :i : e b o t t ] e s c f 
i n j e c t ab 1 e xy 1 oc a i n e (R I! 2 -I ) 
After being charged with various drug-related offenses, 
defendant fi led a motion to suppress "The court :-r n :: A \e 
i ii :: t:i :: i i, i: i :i ] i ng th at tl I s automobi le stop was just I i laruy 
based on the offi cer's observation of traffic violations (R. 
] 74 75) The court also hel d that the seizure was justified 
11I in I! ' in IMI ep! IUII based mi I In I! I it ui " i i eaboiicibl e tiusp.ii .imj 
t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t s of t h e c a r we Me i n v o l v e d w i il h I l l e g a l 
d r u g s , oi , a J t e r n a t i v e l y , t h a t t h e scope of t h e s t o p was 
j u s t i f l a M j, i'Xpaiji luiil I >, mitjve- lopiiM) MVMII • l1!1 Ill1 M) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
s f i i id ii lgs tl :i at defendai it was 
justifiably stopped for three separ ate traffic violations, 
j •- speedinc. u s^ui^r aillights and a missing front 
The co in: t ' 
recognized that because the trooper observed traffic 
violations, the pi: etext doctrine had no application „ -nis 
case. 
POINT II 
Unde: t: - standard that i- j . ; : t * ?. " . ;-
preponderance - *> dence * --^abl^h reasonat* •-
sua| ) 1c ..etermine 
trooper possessed articulable facts justifying his stop 
11 
the car defendant was driving. In making its findings the 
trial court considered only the troopers had first-hand 
information, obviating the need for further independent 
verification. Moreover, under the totality of the 
circumstances, defendant's extreme nervousness was a factor 
to be considered in assessing the trooper's reasonable 
suspicion that defendant was involved in drug related 
activity. 
POINT III 
The trial court correctly determined that, 
alternatively, confirmation of defendant's use of an alias 
and his passenger/companion's extreme and inexplicable 
nervousness justified expanding the scope of the inquiry. 
The trooper used the most expeditious and least intrusive 
means in pursuing his further investigation by first 
interviewing the passenger, who also was justifiably 
detained based on reasonable suspicion of drug involvement. 
That brief interview, conducted while waiting for the 
results of a license and warrants check, resulted in further 
reasonable suspicion of the couple's drug involvement. 
Immediately thereafter, the trooper questioned defendant and 
fortuitously discovered drugs. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H E C Q U R T p R Q p E R L y D E T E R M I N E D T H A T T R 0 0 p E R 
ELDREDGE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE F1ERO 
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 
* * . - . : . . i i I 11 i d I r,K| 
that the • i: .isiiiiea ;iafn. aoiau^ns were 
clearly erroneous and t ha+ - iFFU;ta*' rul:r,.: was 
: • *
 s
 the record 
does not suppo; ^. . ± tinaiii-it. .^*a Trooper 
Eldiedge • * afri related reasons tei .-toper.: the car were 
* * * * . ? ^ » search the 
w^. . : drugs i . . . r.;endant's 
argument fails nc :..- because , - re:^rd supports the 
cc*r
m
 r f indir *: * * " \ - * br:a:;"e the picit - "ioctr.*" i 
without el. tee it win JO the officer observes a tratfic 
violation, regardless of his underlying motivations, 
A. The Trial Courtfs Findings of Fact are 
Acppyded Pefgygnce. 
xx
 [ T h < +r •' . r 1 I I i- i P W 1 I! I 1 I  I I" II 1 uri II 1  " O i l I ' l S 
aeiermininatic:. . h^etiiei a traffic violation was committed 
.*efendan* -^.ierally argues tn«t :.is rights were 
violated under both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 11. It is unnecessary for 
this Court to separately consider claims made under the 
state constitution. See State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947# 
(Utah App. 1993)(declining to consider claims asserted under 
the state constitution where the defendant did not preserve 
his claims at trial, offered no separate state 
constitutional analysis and claimed no broader 
protection)(citations omitted) 
in the officer's presence under a clearly erroneous 
standard-" State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 22 0, 224 (Utah App. 
1995)(citing State v. Delaney. 869 P.2d 4# 6-7 (Utah App. 
1994)). *[The appellate court] consistently defer [s] to the 
trial court on matters regarded as "empirical, such as 
things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, 
or taking place.'" Id. (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 935 (Utah 1994)). Deference is accorded the trial 
court's findings because it is in the "best position to 
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of 
the proceedings as a whole." Pena, 896 P.2d at 936. "On 
appeal, [the appellate court] will not disturb a trial 
court's findings regarding traffic violations committed in 
the officerfs presence unless those findings are against the 
clear weight of evidence." Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 224-25. 
B. The Stop of the Fiero was Justified at its 
Xnceptjpn ap » Traffic Stop Because TrPQpgr 
Eldredge Observed Defendant Committing Traffic 
Viplatj-Pftg. 
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 What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and 
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.1" State 
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)(citing Terry v. 
QhiQ, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)(quoting Elkins v. 
United States. 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (I960))). 
Determining whether a search or seizure is "constitutionally 
reasonable" involves a two-part inquiry. Id. This Court 
must first ask whether the officer's action was "'justified 
at its inception,'" and second, whether "the resulting 
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detention was *reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place.'" Id, at 1132-33 (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 19-20). 
In State v. Talbot, the court stated that "a stop is 
lawful if incident to a traffic violation committed in the 
officers' presence." 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing State V, Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881-83 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988)); see also Lop££, 873 P.2d at 1132. "An observed 
traffic violation gives the officer 'at the least, probable 
cause to believe the citizen had committed a traffic 
offense.'" IJL. (quoting State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 882 
n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); accord Spuraeon. 904 P.2d at 225. 
An officer may legally stop a vehicle whenever he suspects 
"that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of 
applicable traffic and equipment regulations.'" Lopez. 873 
P.2d at 1132 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 661 
(1979)). This is because "police officers are under a duty 
to enforce the traffic laws." Id. at 1135; see Spurgeon. 
904 P.2d at 225 (finding officer justified in making an 
investigative stop for speeding and an equipment violation, 
i.e., a broken taillight).5 
The trial court found that Trooper Eldredge observed 
5
 The Spurgeon court noted that broken taillights 
violate Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120 (1993) and Utah Admin. R. 
714-200-3(4) (1995). 
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three traffic violations, to wit: speeding, obscured 
taillight and lack of front license plate (R. 174-75; see 
findings attached at Addendum B). Specifically, the court 
noted that taillights must be functional even during the day 
because they must also illuminate when braking. The court 
also found that even though Nicki had been warned earlier 
about the licence plate violation, defendant should not have 
been operating the car without affixing the license plate to 
the front of the car. The record supports the court's 
findings. 
1 • Speeding 
Trooper Eldredge indicated that the Fiero was traveling 
about sixty miles per hour when he first observed it (R. 114). 
Defendant argues that the trial court's finding that defendant 
was speeding was clearly erroneous because the record contains no 
evidence of what the posted speed limit on Route 191 was on 
January 24, 1995. However, the court was entitled to take 
judicial notice, and evidently did take notice, under rule 201, 
Utah Rules of Evidence,6 that the speed limit on that section of 
6
 Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact 
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial 
notice, whether requested or not. 
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Route 191 was fifty-five miles per hour.7 
2. Disfunctional Taillights 
Trooper Eldredge could not see the taillights, even 
though the vehicle's headlights were illuminated at the 
time, because they were covered with mud (R. 114). In Utah, 
all vehicles must be equipped with tail lamps and stop 
lamps. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-120 and 41-6-121.10 (1993). 
*It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive . . . a vehicle 
. . . which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any 
person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at 
all times equipped with lamps and other equipment in proper 
7
 Since the court found that Trooper Eldredge properly 
stopped defendant for speeding, it was not necessary for the 
court to make the subsidiary finding that defendant was in a 
fifty-five mile per hour the zone. See Lopez. 873 P.2d at 
1130 (u[W]hen a trial court has failed to make findings of 
fact on the record, [the appellate court] will 'assume that 
the [trial court found facts] in accord with its decision' 
whenever it would be "reasonable to assume that the court 
actually made such findings.'")(citing State v. Ramirez. 817 
P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 (Utah 1991)). 
The speed limit on Route 191 has consistently remained 
fifty-five miles per hour since January 2, 1974. See Utah 
Department of Transportation, Utah Speed Limit Regulations 
(revised ed. 1992)(stating fifty-five mile per hour speed 
limit between mile point 52.39, 3000 feet north of Blanding, 
and mile point 124.13, just south of Moab, not including 
city limits of Monticello, between mile points 71 and 73). 
Trooper Eldredge testified that he stopped defendant at mile 
point 93 1/2, twenty miles north of Monticello (R. 107). 
Plainly, the speed limit, constant for more than twenty 
years, would have been a matter of common knowledge, of 
which the trial court, situated in Monticello, would have 
been aware. 
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condition . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117 (1993). In 
order to appropriately function, tail lamps must be free of 
dirt and be unobscured, a fact the trial court correctly 
recognized. 
3. Missing Front License Plate 
Trooper Eldredge observed the car had no front plate 
(R. 114). It is a class C misdemeanor "to operate upon any 
highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be 
registered without having the license plate or plates 
securely attached . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305 (5) 
(1993) . 
In sum, the record demonstrates that the trial court's 
findings that Trooper Eldredge justifiably stopped the car 
for three distinct traffic violations was not clearly 
erroneous. Nonetheless, defendant argues the trial court 
erred in ruling that the stop for lack of a front license 
plate was not a pretext for searching the car for drugs. 
Appellant's Br. at 14-15. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Recognized that Trooper 
glflredge'g Stpp pf tfre Fierp w^s Not » pretext 
Stpp» 
Defendant supports his pretext claim by arguing that 
Trooper Eldredge "was aware that the occupants of the Fierro 
[sic] had just been cited by another trooper one hour 
earlier for the same violation." Appellant's Br. at 15 
(citing R. 108). The argument is without merit. 
The front license plate violation was not fabricated. 
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Defendant admits in his brief that the front plate was not 
properly affixed to the Fiero. Appellant's Br. at 14. It 
is a class C misdemeanor "to operate upon any highway of 
this state any vehicle required by law to be registered 
without having the license plate or plates securely attached 
. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993). More 
importantly, even though the Fiero had already been cited 
for no front plate, the violation continued to exist when 
the couple failed to secure the plate to the front of the 
car. Trooper Eldredge was therefore justified in stopping 
the car for the same violation since the car was still not 
in compliance when he first observed it. As the trial court 
noted, even though they had been stopped once before for 
the license plate violation, it's still a 
violation. They really should not have gone 
another mile further down the road without fixing 
the front plate; taking it from the window where 
it was obviously not visible and placing it out in 
front where it would be visible. 
(R. 174). Thus, the front plate violation was not 
"concocted" as defendant suggests. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court 
overemphasized the demise of the pretext doctrine in State 
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). He argues "the alleged 
license plate violation was motivated by police suspicions 
unrelated to the traffic stop." Appellant's Br. at 15. In 
Lopez, the court eviscerated the pretext doctrine, calling 
it "superfluous and conceptually flawed." 873 P.2d at 1135. 
The Lopez court said stopping a driver is "constitutionally 
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justified" when the officer either observes a traffic 
violation or has reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense 
is being committed. Id. *This is so despite the officer's 
motivations or suspicions that are unrelated to the traffic 
offense." Id. The court concluded that drivers who commit 
a traffic offense, even one which the police do not 
regularly enforce, M o not have a constitutional right to 
violate any law enacted by the legislature." Id. at 1136. 
Based on Lopez, the trial court correctly rejected 
defendant's pretext arguments. First, Trooper Eldredge 
directly observed up to three traffic violations: speeding, 
obscured taillights, and no front plate. Second, Trooper 
Eldredge also had a reasonable suspicion to expect the 
defendant was committing a more serious crime, such as drug 
trafficking. Appellee's Br. at Pts. II & III. Whether 
Trooper Eldredge's additional motivation for the stop was 
based on his suspicion of drugs, an admitted interest (R. 
114, 138, 142), is irrelevant because the stop was entirely 
justified by observed traffic violations. Therefore, as 
stated earlier, the trial court's finding that the stop of 
the car was justifiably based on traffic violations was not 
clearly erroneous and should be upheld by this Court on 
appeal. 
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POINT II 
TROOPER ELDREDGE ALSO HAD REASON TO SUSPECT 
DEFENDANT WAS COMMITTING A MORE SERIOUS CRIME SUCH 
AS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OR TRANSPORTING 
PRVgg 
Defendant argues that because Trooper Eldredge failed 
to verify the facts communicated to him by Trooper Peterson 
about defendant's and Nicki's drug involvements and because 
the trial court considered some of those facts, including 
defendant's nervousness and the couple's trip to and from a 
known drug source, the trial court incorrectly concluded 
that there was reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. 
Appellant's Br. at 16-22. Defendant's argument fails, 
however, because the trial court relied only on those facts 
for which Trooper Peterson was clearly a reliable source. 
Additionally, the trial court was entitled to rely on 
defendant's behavior and the observations of the couple's 
travel pattern in determining reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity under the totality of the circumstances. 
A. The Standard for Proving Reasonable Suspicion 
is Considerably Less Than a Preponderance of 
the Evidence. 
A stop may also be justified "when the officer has 
'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the 
influence of alcohol . . . [or that] the driver is engaged 
in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting 
drugs.'" Lopfii, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Lopez. 
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831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). *There is no 
bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable 
suspicion." State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. 
App 1991) (citing State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). Instead, reasonable suspicion must be 
"based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the 
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time 
of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted) . 
If reasonable suspicion exists, the officer uhas not only 
the right but the duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the law is being 
violated; and if so, to take such measures as are necessary 
in the enforcement of the law." State v. Whittenback. 621 
P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980) (quoting State v. Folkes. 565 P.2d 
1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)). 
While there is no bright-line test for determining 
reasonable suspicion, it is clear that the threshold is met 
by less than a preponderance of the evidence. "[W]here an 
officer observes unusual conduct which reasonably leads him 
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 
activity may be afoot" a brief investigative stop and 
detention to dispel the officer's suspicion or prevent 
criminal activity is justified. Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 
S. Ct. at 1884 (emphasis added); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 
984, 986 (Utah App. 1994)("an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person 
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has committed or is about to commit a crime") (emphasis in 
original) .8 As the term "may" in Terry implies, an 
officerfs on-the-spot determination of whether there is 
reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop 
requires a weighing of probabilities: 
xThe process does not deal with hard certainties, 
but with probabilities. Long before the law of 
probabilities was articulated as such, practical 
people formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are 
permitted to do the same -- and so are law 
enforcement officers.' 
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 
1585-86 (1989) (quoting United State v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 
411, 418 (1981)); State V, Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
App. 1992) ("In developing a reasonable articulable 
suspicion, law enforcement officers are entitled to reach 
'common-sense conclusions about human behavior,'") (citing 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1586 (1989)). 
That is not to say that officers have unbridled 
discretion to stop and detain citizens without being able to 
articulate some basis for doing so. "The officer, of 
course, must be able to articulate something more than an 
8
 The reasonable suspicion standard is also codified: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp. 1994). 
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inchoate and unparticularlized suspicion or hunch." 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
It is clear, however, that the standard for 
establishing reasonable suspicion is a low threshold of 
proof. "The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal 
objective justification' for making the stop. That level of 
suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Sokolow. 490 U.S. at 7# 109 
S. Ct. at 1585 (citations and some internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added). Accord Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 
S. Ct. at 1884. This Court has also recognized that 
reasonable suspicion requires only a minimal level of 
certainty. See State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 
1990) (stating reasonable suspicion "must be based on 
objective facts suggesting that the individual may be 
involved in criminal activity") (emphasis added). 
B* The Trial Court Correctly Selected Only That 
Information Communicated to Trooper Eldredae 
Giving Rise to an Articulable Suspicion That 
Defendant and Nicki were Involved in Drug-Related 
Activity* 
The trial court found that Trooper Eldredge had 
reasonable suspicion that the occupant's of the car were 
involved in drug-related activity to justify a stop based on 
the following facts: (1) Trooper Peterson had good reason to 
believe that his daughter, Nicki, owner and passenger of the 
car defendant was traveling in, was ua heavy methamphetamine 
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user," that she had admitted having transported drugs and 
that she had a romantic involvement with someone in jail for 
drugs; (2) defendant was traveling under an alias, a 
wsomewhat suspicious" circumstance; (3) Nicki was seen two 
to three days earlier going south towards Phoenix; (4) there 
was evidence that Phoenix was a place from which drugs were 
distributed throughout the United States; and (5) defendant 
was so nervous when stopped by Trooper Collier that he 
dropped his identification (R. 186-87, attached at Addendum 
B).9 
The record supports the trial court's findings 
supporting the trooper's reasonable suspicion that defendant 
and Nicki may have been using and/or transporting drugs. 
Prior to the stop, Trooper Eldredge learned from Trooper 
Peterson that his daughter had a serious methamphetamine 
problem, which included an involvement with a Mr. Judd, an 
individual in jail for controlled substances (R. 110), that 
9
 The court also included in its assessment Nicki's 
nervousness (R. 187). Though not precisely articulated, it 
is apparent that the court considered this factor only in 
its evaluation of the expanding scope of the search 
following the stop and not for the purpose of assessing 
reasonable suspicion to initially stop the car. In ruling, 
the court stated: MT]here was reasonable suspicion to 
continue the inquiry or to expand the scope of the inquiry 
or for it to initially have been an inquiry concerning 
drugs" (R. 188)(emphasis added). Moreover, the court's 
focussed assessment of which evidence it could properly 
consider indicates that it correctly recognized that 
Trooper Eldredge's subsequent interview with Nicki could not 
possibly be included among facts justifying the initial 
stop. 
25 
Nicki had admitted transporting drugs between Arizona and 
Colorado (R. Ill), and that defendant was known as both Mr, 
Davis and Mr. Humphrey (R. Ill), a fact confirmed by 
defendant's handing Trooper Eldredge a license bearing the 
alias, "Brad Davis" (R. 115). 
In addition, Trooper Eldredge had observed the red 
Fiero two or three days earlier traveling south from 
Blanding (R. Ill). Defendant and Nicki had been stopped 
earlier by Trooper Collier near Bluff, a town not far from 
the Arizona border (R. 108). Trooper Eldredge stated that 
Arizona was a known drug-distribution source (R. 112, 135). 
Finally, Trooper Eldredge learned directly from Trooper 
Collier that when Trooper Collier stopped the Fiero earlier 
in the day, he felt "something was going on" because 
defendant appeared very nervous and scared and was shaking 
so badly that he dropped or nearly dropped his driver's 
license and that defendant had yelled at Nicki when she 
consented to a search of the car (R. 110, 113). This 
combination of factors supports the trial court's 
conclusions that there was a reasonable suspicion that Nicki 
and defendant were using and/or transporting drugs. 
C. Trooper Eldredge Was Not Required to 
Independently Verify Trooper Peterson's 
Infprmatipnt 
Defendant challenges the trial court's reliance on 
Trooper Peterson's drug trafficking tip and his "hunches" 
which Trooper Eldredge did not independently verify. 
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Appellant's Br. at 19-20. Defendant's challenge is 
unsupported by the record and the law. 
In addition to information that Trooper Peterson gave 
Trooper Eldredge about Nicki, he also told Trooper Eldredge 
that GJPD Sergeant Franklin told him that Brad Davis's name 
had been brought up in connection with several meth labs in 
Grand Junction (R. 110-12) and that Grand Junction was a 
community with na lot of meth" (R. 113). Trooper Peterson 
also expressed an opinion that defendant was Nicki's new 
drug source (R. 110). 
The trial court excluded all of this additional 
information in its reasonable suspicion assessment (R. 186). 
As defendant notes, see Appellant's Br. at 19, the court 
stated that evidence that defendant's name "had come up" in 
association with methamphetamine labs was too unspecific to 
rely on (R. 179-80, 186). Additionally, as defendant also 
notes, see Appellant's Br. at 19, the court refused to 
consider Trooper Peterson's opinion that defendant was 
Nicki's new drug source. The court recognized that although 
Trooper Peterson was understandably reacting as a concerned 
parent, his opinion was only a "conjecture" on which the 
court could not rely (R. 186). Therefore, the court 
restricted itself only to the information that Trooper 
Peterson had first-hand knowledge of.10 Nonetheless, 
10
 While the information received by Trooper Peterson 
from Sergeant Franklin about defendant's involvement in 
methamphetamine labs in Colorado is not necessary to support 
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defendant apparently argues that Trooper Eldredge should 
also have verified this class of information. The argument 
is equally flawed. 
In State v. Grovier. this Court held that *[a] 
reasonable suspicion may be premised upon an informant's tip 
so long as it is sufficiently reliable." 808 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)(citations omitted). In State v. Case, 
this Court also recognized that w[a]n investigative stop may 
survive the Fourth Amendment . . . if performed by an 
officer who objectively relies on information . . . received 
from other law enforcement sources." 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 
the trial court's ultimate conclusion, the State asserts 
that the trial court erroneously excluded it from its 
consideration. 
u[T]here is a presumption that law enforcement 
officers will convey information to each other truthfully." 
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986)(accepting 
double hearsay among police officers in support of a 
warrant); State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 258 (Utah App. 
1992)(noting that because a primary purpose of hospital 
security was protection of the public, information gathered 
in course of security officers' employment and conveyed to 
police was presumtively reliable). In Roth, this Court 
found that an arresting officer's observations corroborated 
information provided to them by security officers, thereby 
further justifying reasonable suspicion to stop the 
defendant's car. 
In this case Trooper Eldredge corroborated the 
information Trooper Peterson received from Sergeant Franklin 
about defendant's alias (R. 179) when he examined 
defendant's license and found it bore the name "Brad Davis" 
(R. 115). Further, Trooper Peterson told Trooper Eldredge 
that he worked with the GJPD and often talked with officers 
of the GJPD (R. 113). Accordingly, the trial court should 
have found reliable Sergeant Franklin's report of 
defendant's association with methamphetamine labs and 
incorporated that fact into its reasonable suspicion 
assessment. 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(citing United States v. Hensley. 469 
U.S. 221, 232 (1985)). In £a&£, this Court held: 
[I]f the investigating officer cannot provide 
independent or corroborating information through 
his or her own observations, the legality of a 
stop based on information imparted by another will 
depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts 
known to the individual originating the 
information . . . subsequently received and acted 
upon by the investigating officer. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
Defendant mistakenly relies on Case, which is factually 
distinct from this case.11 There, this Court held that an 
arresting officer, relying on a dispatch, lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop the defendant's car. The Court found that 
there was no reliable information underlying the dispatch 
indicating why a stop had to be made and the arresting 
officer "made no independent investigation or observations 
that would provide a separate basis for reasonable 
suspicion." Id. at 1279. 
State v. Roth, is closer to the facts of this case. 
827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992). In Roth, hospital security 
officers accosted the defendant, who was plainly 
intoxicated. Id. at 256. When the defendant drove away 
from the hospital stalling and jerking the car, the officers 
11
 Defendant also relies on State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1996). Because Anderson involved a determination 
of probable cause to arrest, it is not relevant to the 
disposition of this case. Cf. State v. Brucer 779 P.2d 646, 
650 (Utah 1989)(upholding a stop, challenged for lack of 
probable cause, under the less demanding reasonable 
suspicion standard). 
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notified the university police of an intoxicated male, 
providing a detailed description of the car and license 
plate. Id. This Court held that the ensuing stop was based 
on reasonable suspicion, supported not only by reliable 
information, but also by the arresting officer's 
observations. Id. at 258; see also State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 
954, 960 (Utah App.)(finding reasonable suspicion to stop 
car based on dispatching officer's cognizance of specific 
facts of the offense and arresting officer's reliance on 
those facts), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
In the circumstances of this case it would have been 
unreasonable for Trooper Eldredge to independently 
corroborate the information provided by Trooper Peterson. 
First, Trooper Eldredge had no reason to doubt the truth or 
the reliability of the information he received from Trooper 
Peterson, a fellow police officer. Nielsen. 727 P.2d at 192 
and Roth. 827 P.2d at 258, supra note 10. Also, Trooper 
Peterson was Nicki's father. It was therefore reasonable to 
believe that he was well-informed about her activities. 
Moreover, the information supplied by Trooper Peterson was 
sufficiently detailed to suggest that he was being honest. 
Lastly, the information was presumptively true, since 
disclosure of his own daughter's drug involvement could only 
have been something of an embarrassment to Trooper Peterson. 
Second, the information provided by Trooper Peterson 
was, to some extent, corroborated by Trooper Eldredge's own 
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observations and by the information provided by Trooper 
Collier. Trooper Eldredge saw the Piero going south toward 
Arizona two or three days before the stop (R. Ill). He also 
knew the Phoenix area was a major drug distribution center 
(R. 112, 135). Trooper Collier's account of his earlier 
stop of the Fiero also implicitly corroborated Trooper 
Peterson's information. Trooper Collier described defendant 
as extremely nervous and shaky and noted defendant became 
agitated when Nicki consented to a search of the car (R. 
108, 113) . 
In sum, the trial court properly recognized that 
Trooper Eldredge relied on the first-hand knowledge of 
fellow police officers, corroborated and supplemented with 
his own observations, regarding those facts supporting his 
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and Nicki. See Roth. 
827 P.2d at 258 (finding reasonable suspicion to stop based 
on the arresting officer's observations, "coupled" with the 
police dispatch). 
D. Defendants Nervousness at the Earlier Stop was 
One Factor Creating Reasonable Suspicion for More 
Serious Criminal Activity, 
Defendant suggests that his nervousness in the initial 
stop for the front license plate violation should not be 
factored into the reasonable suspicion calculus. 
Appellant's Br. at 20. While this Court has said "nervous 
behavior alone is insufficient to establish a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity," State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 
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952, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added), neither this 
Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever said nervousness 
is not a factor to be taken into consideration. Cf. State 
v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 951 (Utah Ct. App.) (Davidson, J., 
dissenting) ("Nervousness alone does not provide reasonable 
suspicion . . . [b]ut it is a factor to be considered."). A 
defendant's increased nervousness can add to an officer's 
already existing suspicions. United States v. Turner. 928 
F.2d 956 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 881 (1991). 
Furthermore, this Court acknowledged in State v. Trujillo. 
that ua trained law enforcement officer may be able to 
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would 
be wholly innocent to the untrained observed." State v. 
Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980)). 
Therefore, Trooper Eldredge was justified in taking the 
defendant's nervousness into account as one factor adding to 
his reasonable suspicion, particularly in light of his 
experience as an officer. 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that 
Trooper Eldredge possessed articulable facts prior to 
stopping the car to reasonably suspect that defendant and 
Nicki, individually and collectively, were engaged in 
criminal activity related to drugs. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TROOPER 
ELDREDGE DID NOT IMPERMISSIBLY EXCEED THE SCOPE OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH INITIALLY JUSTIFIED THE 
STOP WHEN HE QUESTIONED BOTH NICKI AND DEFENDANT 
ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN THE 
CAR 
Defendant argues that even if the stop was justified 
for traffic violations, further detention and inquiry 
related to drug investigation exceeded the reasons 
justifying the traffic stop. In particular, defendant 
argues that he was impermissably detained for six minutes 
(some part of which may have followed the trooper's 
discovery that there were no outstanding warrants), while 
Trooper Eldredge interviewed Nicki about controlled 
substances. Thereafter, defendant continues, he was 
improperly detained when the trooper questioned him about 
controlled substances. Appellant's Br. at 22-28. This 
argument fails because following the stop Trooper Eldredge 
uncovered further information confirming and increasing his 
reasonable suspicion of defendant's drug related activity 
from both defendant and Nicki. 
A. The Scope of Defendant's Detention was Expanded 
Upon Reasonable Suspicion of More Serious Criminal 
Activity. 
After reasonable suspicion has been established to 
justify a stop, a court then asks whether the resulting 
detention was %%% reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
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place.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 
19-20 (1968)). Once a stop is made, "the detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop.'" Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer. 
460 U.S. 491f 500 (1983)). The length and scope of 
detention "must be "strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation possible." Id. 
(quoting State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 19-20)). The focus is not on 
the length of detention, "but on "whether the police 
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely 
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which 
time it was necessary to detain the defendant.'" State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 
United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)). 
If the sole purpose of a stop is to investigate 
possible traffic offenses, an officer "may request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a 
computer check, and issue a citation." State v. Robinson. 
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(quoting United States 
v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
"Investigative questioning that further detains the driver 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity." Lop££, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
In State v. Marshall, defendant was stopped after his 
turn signal remained blinking for two miles after he had 
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passed another vehicle. Marshall. 791 P.2d at 881. The 
trooper pulled defendant over to inform him of the problem 
and issue him a warning. Id. Upon the trooper's request, 
defendant produced a driver's license, vehicle registration, 
and rental car agreement. The rental agreement said the car 
would be returned to New York in five days. However, 
defendant said he was traveling to San Diego, where he would 
return the car. Defendant was also driving along a well-
known drug trafficking route. JLd at 884. The trooper became 
suspicious that defendant might be transporting drugs and 
began to ask questions about the presence of drugs in the 
car. 
This Court, although noting it was "a close call," 
agreed with the trial court that the detention was 
reasonable. Id. This Court held that xxTrooper Avery's 
questioning of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the 
traffic stop was justified because he had reasonable 
suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more 
serious crime." Id. (citing Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1519). 
Therefore, this Court concluded that the ten-minute 
detention and brief questioning of the defendant was not 
unreasonable. Id. 
In this case the trial court found that *there was 
reasonable suspicion to continue the inquiry or expand the 
scope of the inquiry" (R. 188) based on variety of factors, 
see Appellee's Br. at 29, including defendant's giving 
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Trooper Eldredge an alias at the time of the stop and 
Nicki's unwonted nervousness when questioned by Trooper 
Eldredge in his car (R. 187). The record supports these 
findings. 
Following the stop, and in accordance with prior case 
law, Trooper Eldredge appropriately asked for defendant's 
driver's license, discovering immediately defendant's use of 
an alias (R. 115-16). Although he did not issue a citation, 
Trooper Eldredge showed Nicki, the owner of the car, the 
dirt on the taillights and wiped them clean. After Trooper 
Eldredge wiped off the tailights, he began questioning Nicki 
about the presence of controlled substances in her car, at 
which point Nicki became "very, very nervous and fidgety," 
behavior the trooper found odd considering that Nicki had 
known him and his wife for several years (R. 116) . Thus, at 
this point Trooper Eldredge had come upon at least two 
pieces of additional information which confirmed and 
intensified the trooper's suspicions and justified further 
detention and inquiry of both defendant and Nicki, to wit: 
defendant's alias (R. 145, 187) and Nicki's peculiar 
nervousness (R. 187). 
While Trooper Eldredge might have immediately and 
justifiably questioned defendant about controlled 
substances, he did not impermissably detain defendant while 
he first questioned Nicki. See State v. Ottesen. 920 P.2d 
183, 185-86 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that the 
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defendant/automobile passenger's detention for fifteen 
minutes while police officer pursued investigation with 
properly detained codefendant driver was not unreasonable); 
State v. Hicrains. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (stating 
that an automobile passenger's seizure "arguably continued 
during the trip back to the [scene of the theft] but was not 
unreasonable because the officers were entirely justified in 
stopping the car") . 
Indeed, questioning Nicki first was probably the most 
expeditious, quickest and least intrusive means of 
investigation. Based on reliable information about Nicki's 
drug involvement, she was at least as appropriate a target 
of the trooper's suspicions as defendant. Cf. State v. 
Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1991) (holding that the 
paucity of facts to support suspicion of automobile theft 
did not justify expanding the scope of inquiry to include a 
warrants check on the defendant/automobile passenger). 
Nicki was not only the-owner of the car but also a person 
Trooper Eldredge had known for years, and therefore, the 
more accessible source of information about whether there 
were drugs in her car. Trooper Eldredge questioned her 
while he waited for the results of a license and warrants 
check on defendant, a period of at most six minutes (R. 117-
18). See Marshall. 791 P.2d at 884 (concerning the 
acceptable length of detention, "common sense and ordinary 
human experience must govern over rigid criteria") (quoting 
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United States v, Sharps, 470 u.s. 675, 685, 105 s. ct. 1568, 
1575 (1985)). 
Having earlier discovered defendant's use of an alias, 
and then having his suspicions intensified by Nicki's 
peculiar behavior and denial of drug involvement (R. 116), 
Trooper Eldredge was justified in turning his attention to 
defendant. Immediately after asking defendant about drugs, 
Nicki requested a coat to keep warm, whereupon the xylocaine 
was discovered in defendant's jacket (R. 118). 
The trial court found that the initial stop was 
justifiably based on an observed traffic violation and 
reasonable suspicion of drug related activity (R. 175, 188). 
Defendant concedes that if he was justifiably detained at 
the outset for drug related activity, then Trooper Eldredge 
did not impermissably expand the scope of that detention 
when he questioned defendant about drugs and discovered the 
xylocaine. Appellant's Br. at 25. Logically, this 
concession also applies to a detention whose scope is 
justifiably expanded, as in this case, upon the subsequent 
discovery of articulable facts that intensify the officer's 
suspicion of other serious crime, such as drug trafficking. 
Coordinate with defendant's concession, the trial court also 
found that the search of defendant's jacket was justified by 
Trooper Eldredge's feeling a "bulky" item in the jacket 
pocket (R. 148), a conclusion unchallenged on appeal. 
In concluding that the stop was either justified at the 
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outset or by the subsequent discovery of other articulable 
facts, the trial court carefully assessed the accumulated 
evidence and sensitively weighed the policy considerations 
surrounding automobile stops as they applied to the case. 
It correctly determined that although "it's a very close 
call, . . . it is enough" (R. 188). 
REQ7SST FOR OEAE AKQUMENT 
Because of the fact-sensitive nature of search and 
seizure issues and the complexity of law relevant to the 
scope of detention, the State believes that oral argument 
will significantly aid in the judicial decision-making 
process. Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3) (1995). 
CONCESSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this . day of September, 
1996. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Defendant/Appellant, Yengich, Rich & Xaiz, 175 East 400 
South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this J>d day 
of September, 1996. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
United States Constitution 
Fourth Amendment — Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-la-1305. License plate and registration card 
violations - Class C misdemeanor. 
It is a class C misdemeanor: 
(1) to break, injure, interfere with, or remove 
from any vehicle any seal, lock, or device on it 
for holding or displaying any license plate or 
registration card attached for denoting 
registration and identity of the vehicle; 
(2) to remove from any registered vehicle the 
license plate or registration card issued or 
attached to it for its registration; 
(3) to place or display any license plate or 
registration card upon any other vehicle than the 
one for which it was issued by the division; 
(4) to use or permit the use or display of any 
license plate, registration card, or permit upon 
or in the operation of any vehicle other than that 
for which it was issued; 
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any 
vehicle required by law to be registered without 
having the license plate or plates securely 
attached, and the registration card issued by the 
division carried in the vehicle, except that the 
registration card issued by the division to all 
trailers and semitrailers shall be carried in the 
towing vehicle; 
(6) for any weighmaster to knowingly make any 
false entry in his record of weights of vehicles 
subject to registration or to knowingly report to 
the commission or division any false information 
regarding the weights; 
(7) for any inspector, officer, agent, employee, 
or other person performing any of the functions 
required for the registration or operation of 
vehicles subject to registration, to do, permit, 
cause, connive at, or permit to be done any act 
with the intent, or knowledge that the probable 
effect of the act would be to injure any person, 
deprive him of his property, or to injure or 
defraud the state with respect to its revenues 
relating to title or registration of vehicles; 
(8) for any person to combine or conspire with 
another to do, attempt to do, or cause or allow 
any of the acts in this chapter classified as a 
misdemeanor; 
(9) to operate any motor vehicle with a camper 
mounted on it upon any highway without displaying 
a current decal in clear sight upon the rear of 
the camper, issued by the county assessor of the 
county in which the camper has situs for taxation; 
(10) to manufacture, use, display, or sell any 
facsimile or reproduction of any license plate 
issued by the division or any article that would 
appear to be a substitute for a license plate; or 
(11) to fail to return to the division any 
registration card, license plate or plates, decal, 
permit, or title that has been canceled, 
suspended, voided, or revoked. 
§ 41-6-117. Operation of unsafe or improperly 
equipped vehicles on public highways - Exceptions. 
(1) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive 
or move or for the owner to cause or knowingly 
permit to be driven or moved on any highway any 
vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in 
such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, 
or which does not contain those parts or is not at 
all times equipped with lamps and other equipment 
in proper condition and adjustment as required in 
this chapter or in rules issued by the department, 
or which is equipped in any manner in violation of 
this chapter or those rules or for any person to 
do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act 
required under this chapter or those rules, 
(2) Nothing in this chapter or the rules of the 
department prohibit equipment required by the 
United States Department of Transportation nor the 
use of additional parts and accessories on any 
vehicle not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this chapter or those rules. 
(3) The provisions of this chapter and rules of 
the department, with respect to equipment required 
on vehicles, do not apply to implements of 
husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, or farm 
tractors, except as specifically made applicable. 
(4) The provisions of this chapter and rules of 
the department with respect to equipment required 
on vehicles do not apply to motorcycles or 
motor-driven cycles, except as specifically made 
applicable. 
(5) The provisions of this chapter and rules of 
the department do not apply to vehicles moved 
solely by human power, except as specifically made 
applicable. 
(6) The provisions of this chapter and rules of 
the department with respect to equipment required 
on vehicles do not apply to: 
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 
41-22-3 either: 
(i) on a highway designated as open for 
off-highway vehicle use; or 
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 
41-22-10.3; or 
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry when 
operated in the manner prescribed by Subsections 
41-22-5.5(3) through (5). 
(7) The vehicles referred to in Subsection (6) 
are subject to the equipment requirements of Title 
41, Chapter 22, and rules promulgated thereunder. 
(8) A federal motor vehicle safety standard which 
conflicts with a provision of this chapter 
supersedes that provision as to any vehicle in 
compliance with the federal standard. The 
department shall report any such conflict to the 
appropriate committees or officials of the 
Legislature and may adopt a rule to replace the 
superseded provision. 
§ 41-6-120. Tail lamps - Illumination of rear 
registration plate - Reflectors. 
(a) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and 
pole trailer, and any other vehicle which is being 
drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, 
shall be equipped with at least two tail lamps 
mounted on the rear, which shall comply with 
regulations issued by the department; provided, 
the department may by regulation allow one tail 
lamp on any vehicle equipped with only one when it 
was made. 
(b) Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall 
be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with 
a white light the rear registration plate. Such 
lamp shall comply with requirements of the 
department. 
(c) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and 
pole trailer shall carry on the rear, either as a 
part of the tail lamps or separately, two or more 
red reflectors meeting the requirements of the 
department. 
§ 41-6-121.10. Stop lamps required - Supplemental 
stop lamps - Turn signals. 
(a) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, 
and pole trailer shall be equipped with two or 
more stop lamps meeting the requirements of the 
department, provided the department may by rule 
allow one stop lamp on any vehicle equipped with 
only one when it was made. 
(b) Supplemental stop lamps shall emit a red 
light and shall be mounted not lower than 15 
inches above the roadway. A supplemental stop lamp 
may be mounted on the rear of a vehicle, if it is 
mounted on the vertical center line of the vehicle 
and is constructed and mounted so that no light 
emitted from the device, either direct or 
reflected, is visible to the driver. Size, design, 
and candle power shall conform to federal 
standards regulating stop lights. 
(c) Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, 
and pole trailer shall be equipped with electric 
flashing turn signal lamps meeting the 
requirements of the department, except that 
passenger cars and trucks less than 80 inches in 
width and manufactured or assembled prior to 
January 1, 1953, need not be equipped with 
electric turn signal lamps. 
§ 77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect - Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must 
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that 
it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial 
notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with 
the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard 
as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and 
the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of 
prior notification, the request may be made after 
judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or 
proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to 
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the 
jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Utah Administrative Code 
R714-200-3. Prohibited Lamps, Lighting Accessories, 
Decorative Lamps. 
(1) It is the purpose of this section to address 
the reference to "lamp" as set forth in Section 
41-6-141.5. 
(2) Head lamp covers, tints, emblems, decals or 
other foreign materials not in place at the time 
of original manufacture or not specifically 
intended for use by the vehicle's original 
manufacturer, and which do not meet the standards 
of Title 49 CFR 571 Standard 108, U.S.D.O.T., 
shall not be placed on, in or over a head lamp. 
(3) Continuous operation daytime running lamps, 
(low beam head lamps) and associated system 
components, are permitted on vehicles. 
(4) Tail lamps, turn signal lamps, back-up lamps 
and other factory installed lamps on a vehicle's 
exterior, as described in Title 49 CFR 571 
Standard 108 (S5) , shall not have any decals, 
tints, emblems, inserts or other foreign material 
on the lamp or lens that was not in place at the 
time of original manufacture or not specifically 
intended for use by the vehicle's original 
manufacturer. 
(5) Flashing lights are prohibited on any vehicle 
except as authorized by Subsection 41-6-140 (c). 
License plate lamps, clearance lamps, antenna 
lamps, deck lamps and interior lamps visible from 
a vehiclefs exterior are included in this section. 
(6) No accessory lamp, decorative lamp, auxiliary 
lamp, ornamental lamp or lamp system, may be 
offered for sale, kept for sale, sold installed or 
used on a vehicle, that does not meet the 
requirements of Title 49 CFR Standard 108, 
including color, positioning, aiming and location. 
No colored lamps or lenses not specifically 
covered by Title 49 CFR Standard 108, may be 
installed on or in a vehicle, where the colored 
lamp or lens would be visible to the exterior of 
the vehicle. This includes any blue, purple, 
green, violet, lavender, or pink lamps or lenses. 
(7) This rule does not apply to implements of 
husbandry, road making machinery, farm tractors, 
except as specifically made applicable, and off 
highway use vehicles as described in Section 
41-6-117. 
(8) Aftermarket .illuminating products not 
approved under this rule may be submitted to the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators, an agent for the department, for 
testing and approval prior to the marketing, 
installation or use of such products. 
(9) If a person is denied approval of any 
after-market illuminating device by the 
department, appeal may be made in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, and such appeal shall be 
considered an informal adjudicative proceeding. 
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D. is ten to Exhibit No. 1 and the information that was 
{available to the officer, as you listen to Exhibit No. 1, 
You'll hear Trooper Eldredge himself in being involved in 
pome of those conversations, nothing developed. Rather than 
bet the individual on his way, he fabricated the search of 
the coat. He then again fabricated the DUI and at that 
point, Your Honor, I think he was well beyond the 
Constitutional permissible scope, and I think it's necessary 
{for the court to suppress any information from the stop and 
[from the search. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls, I'm going to save you 
Jsome time and direct your efforts to what I really want to 
hear about. It's pretty clear to me that with the pretext 
{rule announced by the supreme court that — that there was 
reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity, even a minor 
traffic offense for these individuals to be stopped in the 
jfirst place. It was either speeding, or having an obscure 
tail light, which I think is illegal even if it's day time, 
prou should have all of your equipment working property even 
curing day time, because at least you need your break lights 
during the day time. Oh, and similarly, even though they hadj 
been stopped once before for the license plate violation, 
p.t'6 still a violation. They really should not have gone 
another mile further down the road without fixing the front 
License plate; taking it from the window where it was 
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1 obviously not visible and placing it out in front where it 
2 (would be visible. 
So# I don't have any problem with the initial stop beingj 
4 based on reasonable -suspicion. Similarly, once the Zylocane 
5 Was found, I don't think under all of the circumstances at 
6 [Least reasonable suspicion to believe that there drugs in the) 
7 Vehicle to hold them long enough for the drug dog to get 
8 {there. So, I think the crux of this case is whether at the 
9 time the stop expanded being simply a traffic stop and maybe 
10 kt never was to becoming a — to an inquiry concerning drugs,] 
11 whether there was reasonable suspicion of further criminal 
12 activity beyond that observed with regard to the traffic 
13 ptop. Mr. Halls. 
14 MR. HALLS: Your Honor, let me, I guess, talk 
15 jabout that this way. What the Court is focusing on is the 
16 traffic stop aspect of it, and I think it's clearly — 
17 essentially what the officer testified that he was going 65 
18 piles an hour, that we had no front plate, and that he had 
19 tail lights that were obscured. Now, we're not talking about] 
20 the lights being turned on. I agree with Mr. Schultz. But 
21 kou have to have your brake the lights visible, basically. 
22 Bo, I think we have a circumstance for a traffic stop, but wej 
23 pad every right to stop him. I can understand whether the 
24 court may have some concern about whether or not — what we 
25 no at that point. And for that reason, I guess this is the 
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Jknd we do thatf I think, to protect the Constitutional Right 
{to say no. 
So, what we're left with here is — Oh, and what I 
cannot consider, I think, is that there is evidence that Mr* 
Humphrey was Involved with drugs in Grand Junction. The best! 
{that we can say, as far as a factor to be considered is, that] 
{there is somebody in the police or in the police department 
pr sheriff's office in Grand Junction that thinks Mr. 
Humphrey has something to do with drugs. But since it's not 
{articulated as to some specific fact that indicates his 
pLnvolvement, that is a — that is a very slender weight to 
{rely on. I don't know whether I can even place one of my 
{toes on that in trying to find reasonable suspicion. 
So, what we're left with is the father of the owner of 
phe vehicle and the passenger has very good reason to believej 
that she's a heavy methamphetamine user. She has told him 
that she has transported drugs. She — she has had a 
romantic involvement with someone who is now in jail for 
prugs. I don't think I can consider that she is now getting 
prugs from some other source, because as far as I could tell,] 
{that is just — that's just his conjecture. That's a 
conclusion he reaches, and parents may feel very comfortable 
pn acting on these things, but judges cannot. The person 
{she's involved with is someone that now — romantically 
{involved with, who is the driver of the vehicle, is someone 
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Who may have an alias. Well, that's somewhat suspicious, 
phey were seen, or at least, she was seen going with someone 
tin the car going south towards Phoenix two or three days 
earlier, and she's now going north. There's some weight 
It here. Phoenix is a place from which drugs are distributed 
{throughout the United States. There's evidence of that. 
Mr. Humphrey had been so nervous that the dropped his ID wheri 
lie was stopped earlier that day. And that — Nervousness isj 
never alone justification for a — is never alone reasonable 
[suspicion. But, I understand the court of appeals to say it 
pay be a factor to be considered. And then if allow that the] 
[initial stop was proper as a traffic stop, there is the 
additional factor of the nervousness of Miss Vought who knew 
the officer that stopped her very well. And, in fact, — 
Well, knew here very well. The details of that are in 
evidence. The questions is whether that is — whether all 
those factors are reasonable suspicion. And the question 
might be phrased, "If you knew this about someone, would it 
be reasonable to suspect that they had drugs?" Someone is 
always using — is a heavy user of drugs, has transported 
|irugs, using — with someone using an alias, had been going 
towards a drug destination or a drug outlet two or three days] 
earlier and was now returning from that area — of course, 
{there's lots of innocent things they could have been doing -
they're very nervous, are those things enough. And you know,! 
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k've been going back and forth during this entire hearing as 
fco whether those things are enough, because another way you 
pan phrase it is, "Do we want police officers stopping people] 
every time they have these factors?" I don't think we want 
police officers stopping people just because they're heavy 
prug users. You don't get to stop people just because 
they're heavy drug users. You don't get to ask about drugs 
Kust because people are nervous* You don't get to stop 
people just because they were going south a few days earlier, 
ptou don't get to stop people just because they've admitted 
transporting drugs in the past. You don't get to stop people} 
Hust because they've used aliases in the past. But if you 
put all five of those factors together, where those things 
coincide, would it be permissible for police officers to 
stop? Is there enough to support reasonable suspicion? And 
k'm not at all totally convinced — Well, I believe that I'n) 
tight about this, but I realize it's a very close call. I 
think it is enough. 
Therefore, there was reasonable suspicion to continue 
fche inquiry or to expand the scope of the inquiry or for it 
po initially have been an inquiry concerning drugs. So, I 
peny the Motion to Suppress. 
Now, we've had — I think we've already had an 
arraignment and the defendant's entered pleas of not guilty, 
bf you want to set the trial date at this time, or do you 
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